Japan has moved to lift its long-standing prohibition on exporting lethal weapons, a change welcomed by many allies and denounced by some regional rivals. The government confirmed that Japanese companies may now sell advanced military equipment to 17 countries with which Tokyo has defense ties, reversing export restrictions that had been in place since 1967. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration frames the shift as a way to bolster Japan’s own security by enhancing the defenses of partner nations.
Tokyo’s leaders say the policy responds to growing demand for Japanese defense systems and will help allied militaries become more capable. Officials argue the transfers will deepen cooperation with like-minded states and strengthen deterrence in an increasingly contested neighborhood.
Strategic concerns are a key driver. Analysts point to China’s expanding naval presence and North Korea’s development of longer-range missiles as factors altering the regional balance and pressuring Japan to act. Masayuki Masuda, director of Chinese studies at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, has argued that Japan must support partners such as the Philippines and Australia to help preserve the balance of power and deter potential threats.
Early recipients include Australia and the Philippines. Tokyo and Canberra have finalized a roughly $6.5 billion agreement for 11 upgraded Mogami-class frigates, vessels already in service with Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force. The first three ships will be built in Japan and delivered by 2030, with the remaining vessels to be constructed in Australian yards. Indonesia has expressed interest in Oyashio-class submarines, and the Philippines is reportedly considering Abukuma-class destroyer escorts that Japan is phasing out — moves that would strengthen maritime capabilities as rival activity increases in the South China Sea.
Japan is also pursuing advanced defence collaboration. It is part of the Global Combat Air Programme with the United Kingdom and Italy to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter, and it is working with the United States on a Glide Phase Interceptor intended to counter hypersonic missile threats.
Observers say both strategic and domestic political motives underpin the change. Margarita Estevez-Abe of Syracuse University notes that the drive to sell defense equipment predates Prime Minister Takaichi and builds on incremental relaxations of export rules by previous leaders. She identifies two immediate pressures: U.S. calls for allied burden-sharing and higher defense spending, which Tokyo prefers to channel into domestic arms production rather than purchasing foreign systems; and a political effort by some Japanese leaders to relax restrictions stemming from Article 9 of the constitution, with heightened regional tensions potentially making constitutional revision easier to justify.
Allies have largely greeted the move positively. U.S. and European officials say it will enable deeper cooperation and contribute to security in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Beijing, by contrast, sharply criticized the decision as inconsistent with Japan’s postwar pacifist posture and warned it could destabilize the region.
Estevez-Abe rejects that characterization, saying such criticism is predictable whenever Tokyo adopts a firmer security stance. She argues the policy will cement existing partnerships and open opportunities for new ties as middle powers reassess their dependence on U.S. arms. Reducing reliance on American weaponry, she says, forms part of a broader strategic recalibration among U.S. allies.
Japan’s decision marks a notable departure from decades of postwar restraint. How much it strengthens deterrence without exacerbating regional friction will depend on Tokyo’s choices: which systems are transferred, how transfers are coordinated with partners, and how Japan balances military support with diplomatic engagement.