Peter Magyar’s victory in Hungary’s April 12 parliamentary election reflected more than anger at corruption and economic hardship: it was a repudiation of Viktor Orban’s “illiberal democracy,” a rejection of his drift from the European mainstream and a warning against moving too close to Moscow.
Two of Orban’s closest allies — Slovakia’s Robert Fico and Czechia’s Andrej Babis — offered prompt but carefully measured congratulations. Babis wrote that Magyar had earned voters’ trust and must not disappoint. Fico, known for long statements, instead sent journalists a terse three-point email saying he respected Hungarian voters’ decision and was ready for “intensive cooperation” with Budapest.
Fico emphasized that Slovakia’s priorities would not change: reviving the Visegrad Group, protecting shared energy interests, and restoring Russian oil flows via the Druzhba pipeline, which have been halted since January following attacks in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said repairs could begin in the coming weeks, raising the prospect of resumed supplies.
The cautious responses from Bratislava and Prague reflect both the scale of the shift in Budapest and the uncertainty now facing Central Europe, where Orban long served as a central figure in a loose alliance of nationalist and populist leaders. Orban co-founded the euroskeptic Patriots for Europe group with Babis in 2024, and his defeat removes a key partner on the European stage — a leader who had been an interlocutor with both Moscow and Washington.
For Fico, a pro-European Hungary presents a political risk at home. Martin Poliacik, a former Slovak MP, said the biggest threat to Fico is proof that a pro-European Hungary is possible, as Slovaks might then see a different path. Some fear Russia may shift attention to Slovakia, but others doubt Fico can replace Orban as Moscow’s principal ally in Europe. Critics note Fico appears tired and lacks the strong, combative team Orban built. Though Fico threatened to block an EU €90-billion loan to Ukraine if Orban fell, there is scepticism he would be willing to confront the rest of the EU alone.
Analysts also caution that Magyar’s win does not guarantee long-term stability. Poliacik described European politics as volatile, with the status quo hard to maintain. That volatility is evident in Prague: Babis returned to power in late 2025 heading a coalition with his ANO movement, the conservative Motorists for Themselves, and the far-right, anti-immigrant SPD. Critics accuse this government of attempting to reshape Czech liberal democracy — targeting public media and civil society — echoing Orban’s playbook; supporters deny the charge.
But there are structural limits to what Babis can achieve in Czechia. Political commentator Jindrich Sidlo noted that Babis learned during his first term that he cannot exert the same control Orban did in Hungary. Orban governed longer, secured different electoral results, and oversaw changes such as shaping Hungary’s electoral system to his advantage; Czech institutions, including a Senate, make comparable centralization far harder. In this sense, Babis is a weaker analogue of Orban.
Beyond national politics, Orban’s defeat could weaken a broader network of right-wing, sovereigntist alliances he helped build. Andras Lederer of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee said Hungary under Orban supported like-minded actors across Europe politically and financially, funding think tanks, advocacy groups, and media aligned with his vision. With Orban out, that network may diminish or even disappear.
The implications for regional cooperation are significant. The Visegrad Group has been largely dormant since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine exposed deep divisions: Poland and Czechia have backed Kyiv strongly, while Hungary under Orban and Slovakia under Fico took more hostile positions. Babis has signalled interest in reviving Visegrad and has moved to improve ties with Bratislava. But without Orban, a new Hungarian government seeking better relations with Brussels, and a Poland that is likely uninterested until the next election in Warsaw, the bloc looks more moribund than ever.
Edited by: Aingeal Flanagan