Peter Magyar’s surprise win in Hungary’s parliamentary election last weekend signaled more than voter anger over corruption and economic strain. It was a clear rejection of Viktor Orban’s “illiberal democracy,” a move back toward the European mainstream and a warning against drawing closer to Moscow.
Two of Orban’s closest regional allies — Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico — quickly offered carefully worded congratulations. Babis wrote on X that Magyar had “earned the trust of the majority of Hungarians” and warned, “He must not disappoint.” Fico, who usually issues lengthy statements, sent journalists a terse email: he respected Hungarian voters’ choice and said he was ready for “intensive cooperation” with Budapest.
Fico also stressed that Slovakia’s priorities remain unchanged: reviving the Visegrad Group, protecting shared energy interests and restoring oil flows to Slovakia and Hungary through the Druzhba pipeline. Those supplies were halted after Kyiv said Russian missiles and drones struck a section of the pipeline in Ukraine; Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently said repairs could begin in the coming weeks.
The cautious responses from Bratislava and Prague reflect the scale of the political shift in Budapest and the uncertainty now facing Central Europe. Orban had been a central figure in a loose alliance of nationalist and populist leaders; he co-founded the Eurosceptic Patriots for Europe group with Babis in 2024. With Orban gone, the symbolic and practical balance within that network is in flux.
For Fico, Magyar’s victory removes a key partner on the European stage. Orban had served as a conduit to both Moscow and Washington; his absence weakens a coordinated front that had often challenged EU positions. Martin Poliacik, a former Slovak MP from the opposition Progressive Slovakia party, said a pro-European Hungary is a threat to Fico politically because it shows Slovaks an alternative is possible. Poliacik also doubts Fico can simply assume Orban’s role as Russia’s chief interlocutor in Europe: “He’s tired,” Poliacik told DW, noting Fico lacks Orban’s long tenure and a robust team of enforcers. Observers also question whether Fico would actually follow through on threats — such as blocking the EU’s €90-billion loan to Kyiv — without Orban’s backing.
Analysts caution that Magyar’s victory does not guarantee long-term stability. “It’s really hard to stay in power in Europe right now,” Poliacik observed, likening politics to a swinging pendulum. That volatility is evident in Prague, where Babis returned to power in late 2025 heading a coalition that includes his ANO movement, the conservative Motorists for Themselves party and the far-right, anti-immigrant SPD. Critics say the new Czech government is already attempting to reshape elements of the country’s liberal democratic system — targeting public media and civil society in ways reminiscent of Orban’s playbook — although Babis and supporters reject that characterization.
Still, structural constraints in Czechia limit what Babis can accomplish compared with Orban in Hungary. Czech commentator Jindrich Sidlo noted that Orban governed far longer, altered Hungary’s institutions to his advantage and faced different electoral realities. In the Czech system, changing things like electoral law requires agreement between both parliamentary chambers, making it harder for a prime minister to push through sweeping institutional changes. “Babis is, in that sense, a much weaker version of Orban,” Sidlo said.
Beyond national politics, Orban’s exit could weaken the network of like-minded actors he helped sustain across Europe. Andras Lederer of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee said Orban provided political and financial support to allied think tanks, media and advocacy groups that promoted a sovereigntist vision. With Orban out, that support is likely to shrink or disappear, diminishing coordinated influence abroad.
The future of regional cooperation formats such as the Visegrad Group is also uncertain. The bloc — comprising Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia — has been largely dormant since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine exposed deep fissures: Poland and Czechia have been strong backers of Kyiv, while Hungary under Orban and Slovakia under Fico took more ambivalent or hostile stances. Babis has signaled interest in reviving Visegrad and has moved to improve ties with Bratislava, but without Orban and with Poland seemingly uninterested in the format until at least the next Polish elections, the group’s prospects appear dim.
In short, Magyar’s victory reshapes the regional landscape. It weakens a once-cohesive bloc of populist leaders, removes a key interlocutor for Moscow in European capitals, and may shrink the informal networks of funding and influence that Orban sustained. Yet the shock does not automatically translate into lasting stability: domestic political dynamics in Slovakia and Czechia, institutional limits on leaders like Babis, and broader European volatility mean Central Europe’s political pendulum may swing again. Edited by: Aingeal Flanagan