Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, has signaled that his country’s deployment in Mozambique’s violence-torn Cabo Delgado province could be pulled out as early as May, using the possibility of withdrawal to press European backers for predictable funding. Kigali says its mission, deployed against Islamist insurgents, may end unless the European Union makes a clear and reliable financial commitment. Reports suggest Brussels is considering ending support; since 2022 the EU has contributed roughly $46 million (€39 million), reportedly under one-fifth of Rwanda’s declared costs.
The mission’s true cost is contested. Borges Nhamirre, a Mozambican security analyst at the Institute for Security Studies, told DW that figures from Kigali are difficult to verify. He pointed to RwandAir billing practices for transport that make it unclear whether invoiced amounts reflect actual expenses, raising the possibility that costs are overstated.
A Rwandan pullout would be a major security shock for Mozambique and pose geopolitical risks for Europe. Nhamirre, however, thinks an abrupt withdrawal is unlikely because Kigali has multiple interests at stake, including business opportunities. Rwanda’s engagement appears intended to be long term: anticipated benefits are linked to the gradual development of offshore gas projects, and private Rwandan security firms expect to secure contracts from international investors. European states also have a clear stake in stabilizing the gas fields, where major investors include firms from France, Italy and other countries; some product shipments have already reached European markets.
More than 4,000 Rwandan personnel have been deployed in Mozambique since 2021 at the Mozambican government’s request, and their replacement would be challenging. They have helped restore security around key energy projects disrupted by terrorism and carry battlefield experience and local networks that amount to what Nhamirre calls “institutional memory.” Any new contingent would confront a steep learning curve against a guerrilla-style insurgency that blends into fishing and farming communities.
At the same time, Kigali is under growing political pressure from Western capitals. EU and US measures over Rwanda’s alleged involvement in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo complicate extensions of support. Nhamirre highlights a political paradox: the EU funds the Cabo Delgado mission even as it politically opposes some of Rwanda’s actions in eastern Congo, creating a risk that European money could indirectly touch both theatres of conflict.
The question of funding has sparked debate inside EU institutions. Portuguese MEP Helder Sousa Silva (EPP), a member of the European Parliament’s Security and Defence Committee, has warned against letting financial support lapse, arguing the Mozambique operation should be assessed separately from Rwanda’s conduct in Congo. Sousa Silva frames Europe’s interest in Cabo Delgado as rooted in security and regional stability, and says the financial burden for the EU is manageable; the real obstacle is collective political will. He cautions that a European withdrawal could create a vacuum vulnerable to actors with questionable intentions.
Mozambique’s situation remains fragile. Its own security forces are not yet able to fully stabilize the province, and a primarily military approach does not address underlying causes such as poverty, exclusion and limited economic opportunities. Kigali’s withdrawal threat functions as calculated leverage: Rwanda signals that continued security will require compensation. For Europe, the dilemma is whether it is willing to pay that price to keep security gains in Cabo Delgado intact.