Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent visit to Damascus and his meeting with Syrian counterpart Ahmed al-Sharaa marked a clear reopening and deepening of Ukraine’s diplomatic engagement in the Middle East. The leaders agreed to cooperate on security and development, discussed the regional outlook and Russia’s war in Ukraine, and expressed mutual interest in exchanging military and security experience. They also explored Ukraine’s potential role as a food supplier to help bolster regional food security and addressed Syria’s pressing energy and infrastructure needs.
The Damascus meeting follows an initial encounter at the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2025, when foreign ministers from both states signed a declaration to resume relations that had been severed in June 2022 after the Assad government recognized the breakaway regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. During the visit, the two sides reached agreements to open diplomatic missions in Kyiv and Damascus in the near future, signaling a formal normalization of ties.
Analysts view the rapprochement as a geopolitical setback for Moscow. Serhiy Danylov of the Kyiv-based Association of Middle East Studies observed that Syria had long been a reliable Russian ally, so its pivot toward Kyiv represents a notable rupture. Dmytro Levus of the Ukrainian Meridian Social Research Center called the visit proof that Russian influence in what it once treated as an exclusive sphere is diminishing.
Food security is central to the renewed relationship. Danylov has argued that under Assad, Syria purchased Ukrainian grain that Russia had appropriated from occupied Ukrainian territories, in effect legitimizing supplies taken during the war. Kyiv has been pressing countries across the Middle East to stop buying grain sourced from occupied areas so Ukraine can supply markets legally and transparently; Egypt has already agreed to such measures, and Syria is now being engaged. Beyond commerce, Ukrainian grain exports could help ease inflationary pressures and reduce the risk of social unrest in countries like Syria, Jordan and Egypt.
Military and security cooperation is another potential pillar of engagement. Mykhailo Honchar of the Strategy XXI Center for Global Studies noted that Ukraine’s combat experience since 2022 has produced advances in systems such as long-range and interceptor drones—capabilities that have drawn Syrian interest. At the same time, Israel’s deep distrust of the current Syrian government complicates any transfer of arms or sensitive technologies, and Kyiv will likely weigh such concerns against its national interest, Honchar said. Practical areas where Ukraine could cooperate without breaching regional red lines include maintaining Soviet-era Syrian equipment, providing humanitarian demining expertise, and assisting in the reconstruction of energy and infrastructure using lessons from Ukraine’s own recovery efforts.
Experts suggest that food supplies, military-technical cooperation, demining and infrastructure work could shape medium-term economic and strategic ties between Kyiv and Damascus. The emerging relationship will also attract geopolitical attention for what it implies about shifting influence in the Middle East and Russia’s waning sway.
This article was originally published in Ukrainian.