Mali’s foreign minister Abdoulaye Diop recently received Nick Checker, head of the US State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, as Washington and Bamako seek to chart a “new course” in their relationship. Checker stressed US respect for Mali’s sovereignty and signaled plans to consult with neighboring military-led states, including Burkina Faso and Niger, on shared security and economic concerns.
Since 2020 the Sahel has seen a string of coups that toppled elected presidents in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Those events prompted the Biden administration to curtail some military cooperation, even as voices in Washington have pushed for pragmatism. Commentators note a shift away from insisting on democracy as the central condition for ties: a stance highlighted last year in remarks to Le Monde by a former Trump administration adviser and criticized by human rights advocates pointing to the prolonged detention of Niger’s deposed president Mohamed Bazoum.
Analysts interpret recent US moves as transactional and pragmatic. Ulf Laessing of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation says American policy appears less focused on democratic norms in the short term, with officials aiming to correct what they call past policy mistakes. For the Sahel juntas, that opening offers diplomatic room to maneuver between global partners.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have all reduced ties with former colonial power France and other Western partners and have courted Russia instead. The three states broke from the West African bloc ECOWAS and created the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a grouping that has reshaped regional alignments. Some observers welcome renewed US engagement, arguing it preserves African agency and prevents any single external power from dominating the Sahel.
Scholars like Dr. Gnaka Lagoke say Washington’s offers could benefit AES countries and that US-EU tensions may create opportunities for the United States. Laessing also points out that the military regimes retain pockets of popularity, particularly among youths disillusioned with old political elites and receptive to a new national identity promoted by the juntas.
Political space has narrowed: in January Burkina Faso’s junta dissolved all political parties, formalizing measures that had already suppressed party activity since the 2022 coup. Interior minister Emile Zerbo framed the move as necessary to unify the country against security and strategic threats. Political scientists note this pattern is common across the three states, where special regimes tolerate little organized opposition.
Security remains the overriding challenge. The Sahel has battled insurgencies since 2012 from groups including the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM). Juntas have vowed to stem violence but attacks continue, from ambushes on convoys to strikes on public targets, underscoring persistent instability.
Russia has expanded its presence in the region, deploying personnel associated with its so-called African Corps and providing training and materiel. Moscow reported cooperative operations with Nigerien forces after an attack on Niamey’s airport, claiming the joint response neutralized attackers and seized weapons. Russian assistance is now a visible element of the security landscape.
US diplomats say they are monitoring jihadist consolidation in the Sahel and have offered services to AES governments to explore possible American roles in counterterrorism, though details remain undisclosed. The Sahel states are resource-rich—gold and lithium in Mali, uranium in Niger, and gold in Burkina Faso—leading analysts to question whether deeper security partnerships are tied to economic interests. Observers caution that while a simple resources-for-security quid pro quo is unlikely, corruption and instability have so far limited large-scale Western resource investment.
The European Union’s influence is inconsistent. With France largely withdrawn militarily from Mali but still engaged in development work, and mixed levels of commitment from other EU states, commentators say Brussels lacks a unified strategy. Regaining influence, they argue, would require a coordinated political effort across member states.
As jihadist threats, military rule and external competition converge, the balance of influence among the United States, Russia, the EU and other actors in the Sahel remains unsettled. How those dynamics will evolve depends on security outcomes, domestic politics within the Sahel states, and the strategic calculations of outside powers.