Recent clashes involving the US, Israel and Iran—and a president warning that ‘a whole civilization will die tonight’—have renewed talk about the decline of the postwar rules-based order. Stacie Goddard, a political scientist at Wellesley College, told DW that we are at a low point for that system of norms and institutions.
What people mean by the ‘rules-based order’ are the norms, treaties and organizations built after World War II and strengthened after the Cold War to regulate state behavior. Institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, along with agreed limits on aggression and a recognized right of self-defense, were intended to reduce great-power violence and promote stability and prosperity.
From the start, however, those ideals were imperfect in practice. Goddard and other scholars argue the order was never truly universal: it was hierarchical and exclusive, and its leading supporters sometimes used the rules to their own advantage. Many countries in the Global South have long viewed the system as tilted against them—beneficial in some ways, but denying them real agency and influence. Amitav Acharya of American University writes that the sense that ‘the rules are rigged’ persists; institutions like the International Criminal Court have reinforced such perceptions, with critics pointing out that most individuals indicted so far have been African (a 2024 Amnesty International report counted 47 of 54 indicted persons as African).
The last decade has further tested confidence in the order. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 directly challenged the principle of sovereignty. Against that backdrop, analysts consider several broad trajectories for what might follow if the old rules-based framework continues to erode.
Hemispheric dominance
One scenario is a return to hemispheric or regional spheres of influence. Some commentators liken elements of former US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy to a modern Monroe Doctrine, asserting stronger U.S. control in the Americas and pressuring states seen as outside its preferred orbit. In a world divided into spheres, China might tighten its hold over parts of South Asia and press its claims over Taiwan, while Russia could act with greater freedom in Eastern Europe.
Goddard cautions that such carve-ups would provoke resistance from states unwilling to be assigned to another power’s domain. She and colleagues at Georgetown have used the term ‘neo-royalism’ to describe a drift away from rules toward small elite networks that shape international politics for their own benefit, producing unpredictable and self-serving behavior rather than disciplined statecraft.
A multiplex world
A different, more plausible outcome is what Acharya calls a ‘multiplex’ order: a diffuse, multipolar system in which power and influence are widely distributed. Rather than a handful of hegons, many actors—middle powers, regional leaders, non-state actors and civil society—play meaningful roles. Global institutions and regional arrangements remain venues for cooperation, but norms and ideas travel horizontally among diverse actors.
In this vision, countries such as the EU members, Indonesia, South Africa, Japan, South Korea and India become key brokers of regional and global governance. Conflicts and competition persist, but no single rivalry or bloc dictates the entire system. The multiplex model promises more pluralism and opportunity for voices outside the traditional Western core.
Systemic collapse
The bleakest possibility is systemic collapse—widespread anarchy, fragmentation and the specter of large-scale war. Both Acharya and Goddard consider such a total breakdown unlikely today; the memory of the catastrophic cost of world wars still restrains most states. Instead, they expect middle powers and coalitions that still value rules and institutions to remain pivotal, pushing back when the costs of disorder become too high.
Which path the world follows will depend largely on choices by those middle and regional powers: whether they pursue independent trade and security arrangements, build military autonomy, and commit to more inclusive, plural rules. If these states act collectively to defend and reform global norms, they could help create a post-Western-designed order that is more balanced and representative. If not, the world may drift toward spheres of influence and elite-driven politics—whatever the precise form, a rules-based order centered on a single model seems less certain than it once did.