Bulgaria’s surprise electoral winner, Rumen Radev, has prompted a central question: will his government confront entrenched corruption and steer the country toward strengthened European integration, or will it drift toward a more illiberal, Russia-friendly model seen in parts of Central Europe? His new grouping, Progressive Bulgaria — an alliance Radev assembled quickly from three small parties — won the April 19 parliamentary vote and appears poised to command an absolute majority. But Radev ran a campaign that left many policy details deliberately vague, so observers look to his past and recent statements for clues about what comes next.
From air force pilot to president
Rumen Radev was born in 1963 in Haskovo, near the Turkish border. A career military aviator, he trained as a pilot under Bulgaria’s communist system and completed further officer training in the United States after democratization. He rose through the ranks and became commander of the Bulgarian Air Force in 2005, a year after Bulgaria entered NATO. His military and security background has shaped both his public image and political network.
Persistent questions about Moscow
Since his first presidential bid in 2016, when he was backed by the Bulgarian Socialist Party, Radev’s possible ties to Russia have drawn attention. Reports and later comments by figures linked to Russian intelligence suggested his candidacy was discussed in Moscow. Scrutiny intensified after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as journalists and analysts probed contacts between figures in his circle and Russian actors. European officials have pointed to networks of former Bulgarian military officers with alleged links to Russian military intelligence as influential during his campaign.
A cautious, sometimes critical line on Ukraine
Radev’s public comments on Ukraine have been mixed. In a 2021 debate he described Crimea as “currently Russian,” a phrase he later clarified to mean it is controlled by Russia but remains Ukrainian territory. After 2022 he publicly called for Russia to stop its aggression, yet he has also criticized Western military aid to Kyiv, arguing such support prolongs the fighting. He referred to those who push arms deliveries as “warmongers” and questioned the wisdom of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Those positions raise concerns among EU partners that he might resist collective European approaches to the war.
Not simply “the next Orban,” but vulnerabilities exist
Analysts caution against equating Radev directly with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán or Slovakia’s Robert Fico. Still, Bulgaria’s information space is fragile: Russian disinformation is widespread, and many citizens face difficulty obtaining reliable, unbiased reporting. Sofia’s foreign ministry coordinated with the European Commission to prepare a unit aimed at countering possible Russian meddling — an initiative Radev criticized as foreign interference. The combination of a porous media environment and influential domestic networks with pro-Russian ties creates a setting in which illiberal tendencies could gain ground if political incentives align.
Anti-corruption rhetoric and past protest movements
Radev backed the large anti-corruption protests of 2021, famously telling demonstrators, “Let’s get rid of the mafia!” Those protests targeted entrenched power networks linked to former prime minister Boyko Borissov and media-business figure Delyan Peevski, who was later sanctioned by the US and UK for alleged corruption. The protests helped spawn the pro-European, anti-corruption We Continue the Change movement; its founders, Kiril Petkov and Asen Vasilev, served in an interim government appointed during Radev’s presidency. Whether Radev will translate his protest-era rhetoric into sustained judicial and institutional reform remains an open question.
Possible alliances and the path ahead
Radev’s next moves will hinge on whom he chooses to work with. He has so far excluded cooperation with the nationalist, pro-Russia Revival party, which will sit in the new parliament. One plausible route is rapprochement with pro-European, anti-graft forces such as the We Continue the Change—Democratic Bulgaria coalition (PP-DB). Securing their backing could give Radev the qualified majority needed to attempt deep changes to the judiciary and other institutions he considers captured by corrupt networks.
But aligning with PP-DB would require compromising on other priorities and convincing skeptical partners that he will pursue genuine reforms. Alternately, pressure from pro-Russian elements within his broader network, combined with the country’s vulnerable information ecosystem, could nudge policy in a less EU-aligned, more transactional direction.
What to watch
Key indicators of the government’s trajectory will include: personnel choices for the justice system and security services; concrete reforms to increase transparency and break oligarchic influence; Bulgaria’s voting and rhetoric on EU measures related to Ukraine; and how Moscow-linked narratives play out in domestic media and politics. If Radev pursues judicial and anti-corruption reform in partnership with pro-EU forces, his presidency could mark a meaningful shift toward accountability. If instead he prioritizes ties to pro-Russian factions or tolerates media and information manipulation, Bulgaria may edge toward the kind of illiberal governance seen elsewhere in the region.
Originally published in German.