The Iran war and the resulting blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have refocused attention on international shipping. Russian officials are pushing the Northern Sea Route (NSR), an Arctic lane along Russia’s northern coast, as a safer, more efficient path. President Vladimir Putin said in April the route’s importance as “the most safe, reliable and efficient path is becoming ever more obvious.”
The NSR is the shortest maritime link between Asia and Europe, potentially cutting travel distance by up to 40% compared with the Suez Canal route. But the route is frozen for much of the year and carries major political and environmental complications. The Bellona Environmental Foundation, which tracks the NSR, questions how realistic Russia’s vision of the route becoming a major global shipping passage really is.
Russia had set a target of moving 80 million tons of cargo via the NSR by 2024, but ambitions were hit by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions. Rosatom, the NSR infrastructure operator, recorded around 38 million tons of cargo in 2022 — less than half the goal and under 1% of global maritime trade, compared with up to 15% that typically transits the Suez Canal. Despite this, Moscow plans significant investment, budgeting about 1.8 trillion rubles (roughly €20.5 billion/$24 billion) for NSR development through 2035.
As of 2024 the NSR remains mainly a conduit for Russian crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), which made up more than 80% of cargo, according to Bellona’s 2025 report. Ksenia Vakhrusheva, Bellona’s Arctic project adviser and co-author of the report, says the economics do not match the image Russia promotes.
The NSR’s increased accessibility owes to climate change melting Arctic ice, but it remains fully navigable only for a short season — roughly mid-summer to mid-autumn — and even then is threatened by floating ice. The rest of the year the route is covered by thick ice, making passage possible only with icebreaker support. Russia is the only country operating nuclear-powered icebreakers; it also requires special permits for ships and generally allows only its own icebreakers to escort vessels.
These constraints add cost and risk. Bellona highlights the lack of rapid emergency and rescue infrastructure along the NSR, making incidents more dangerous. Vakhrusheva says it’s unlikely that the route will become easy to navigate within the next decade, and if every transit required an icebreaker the expense would be prohibitive. She also notes geopolitical risk: Russia’s war in Ukraine and its disregard for international law make reliance on a route controlled by Moscow unattractive to other countries.
Environmental risks are also higher in Arctic waters. The idea that shorter routes necessarily reduce greenhouse-gas emissions misses key details: ice-class ships built for Arctic conditions are heavier and burn more fuel per nautical mile than regular vessels. Oil or fuel spills are particularly damaging in cold conditions because hydrocarbons break down much more slowly. Ship emissions of black carbon — soot from engines and heavy fuels — darken ice and snow, reducing reflectivity and accelerating regional warming.
The International Maritime Organization banned the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil in Arctic waters starting in 2024 because of spill risk and black carbon concerns. Russia did not sign up to the ban and has a waiver until 2029, leaving uncertainty about compliance.
European reluctance to use or promote the NSR may be reinforced by these environmental risks. Vakhrusheva says that if European countries refuse to allow cargoes to transit Arctic routes because of vulnerability to environmental harm and climate impacts, the NSR cannot develop into a major corridor.
Asian shipping actors have tested Arctic voyages but remain cautious about major investments. China’s Cosco ran test trips between China and Europe via the Arctic starting in 2013 but halted in 2022 after the invasion of Ukraine; smaller-scale shipments between Chinese and Russian ports resumed in 2023. The container ship Istanbul Bridge completed a China-to-Europe test transit more recently, part of China’s broader “Polar Silk Road” interest. South Korea announced plans for a container ship test through the NSR to Rotterdam in September 2026.
Despite these experiments, major logistics and shipping companies are hesitant to invest heavily in the route. Vakhrusheva sees current engagement as more political than economic. China’s potential involvement is complicated by control concerns: because Russia effectively administers the NSR, Chinese investment would depend on Russian infrastructure, and Beijing prefers influence over assets it helps develop.
Looking further ahead, climate change could alter the NSR’s viability. A 2024 study in Communications Earth & Environment suggested the NSR might become navigable year-round by 2100. But Vakhrusheva warns that if such warming occurs, the world will face far broader crises, raising questions about who would use the route and whether its opening would even matter amid global upheaval.
Edited by: Hannah Cleaver