Ghana sits on abundant global commodities — gold, cocoa and oil — and this helps the country earn more from exports than it spends on imports. But open market access granted under trade agreements has also exposed local producers to steep competition from cheaper imports.
A striking example is poultry: roughly 80% of the chicken eaten in Ghana is imported frozen from Europe, the United States or Brazil. Producers in those exporting countries often use only breast meat domestically and ship the rest overseas. Even after Ghana applies a 30% import duty, imported chicken can still be around 35% cheaper than locally raised poultry, according to a 2023 study. That price gap discourages domestic chicken farming and undercuts job creation. “If you produce the chicken, they’re not buying it. So you can’t produce it,” said Charles K. Donkor, chairman of the Poultry Farmers Association in Ghana’s Ashanti region, who runs a sizable farm employing 200 people.
Longstanding trade frameworks have shaped this relationship. Starting with the Lomé Convention in 1975 and followed by agreements in Cotonou (2000) and Samoa (2023), Europe and many African states established frameworks that underpin numerous bilateral and regional free-trade arrangements. Today, 44 of Africa’s 54 countries have duty-free access to the EU market, often under “everything but arms” provisions for low-income nations. Yet tariff-free access by itself does not guarantee balanced benefits.
A review of 25 years of trade data shows that trade between Africa and Europe has risen in both directions since 2000. In recent years several African economies have recorded trade surpluses with Europe, but those gains are highly concentrated. Energy exports — oil and gas from Libya and Algeria and large fossil-fuel shipments from Nigeria and Angola — account for much of Africa’s positive balance with the EU. Between 2020 and 2022 the value of those exports more than doubled as global energy markets shifted after the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa and rubber exports are another source of surplus. At the same time, more than half of African countries run a negative trade balance with Europe.
Two related patterns make these flows fragile and unequal. First, African exports to Europe are more volatile because they are often unprocessed raw materials whose prices swing on global markets. Second, Europe’s exports to Africa are mostly processed or partially manufactured goods that capture greater value. “Exports of goods from Africa to Europe amount to around 25–30 percent. But the African market is negligible for Europe,” said Anja Berretta of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, noting the imbalance between raw-material exports and higher-value manufactured imports.
There are avenues to improve the terms of trade. African countries that reinvest commodity windfalls to build industry and diversify — Ghana and Mauritius are cited examples — can reduce vulnerability to price shocks. The EU is also seeking to diversify suppliers of critical inputs and reduce dependence on single partners, opening potential demand for African minerals and raw materials. “I think Africa has a lot of these minerals that the EU needs,” said Joseph Matola of the South African Institute of International Affairs, while urging African governments to prioritize exporting processed goods to capture more local value.
The EU has offered support through initiatives such as the Global Gateway, pledging about €150 billion for infrastructure and energy projects in Africa. Meanwhile, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), in force since 2021, promises to knit markets together but has so far been slow to dismantle trade barriers in practice.
Non-tariff barriers — long border delays, inconsistent customs procedures and poor transport infrastructure — make intra-African and international trade slow and expensive. “For example, if you try to get your goods from Namibia to Kenya, it takes a really, really long time,” Berretta said. Observers hope AfCFTA will help countries reduce such frictions and also give African states collective leverage in negotiations with external partners. “They should use the AfCFTA as a negotiating platform instead of acting alone,” Matola said.
This analysis draws on 25 years of trade data; figures for 2025 were not available at the time of reporting. DW has published the underlying data, code and methods in its GitHub repository. Further data-driven reporting is available on DW’s site. Reporting contributions were made by Isaac Kaledzi in Accra. Edited by Sertan Sanderson.
