When the US and Israel began striking Iran on February 28, many in Tehran cheered from their rooftops — a response that surprised some given the legal controversies surrounding the attacks and Tehran’s long-standing hostility toward Washington and Jerusalem. For many Iranians, though, civilian suffering is an acceptable price if it helps topple the theocratic regime. Regime change therefore remains a possibility amid mixed and shifting US statements about war aims.
US President Donald Trump urged Iranians who had protested in January to “stand up” and promised that once the campaign finished they could “take over your government.” Hours later came reports that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had been killed in a strike. Even with that claim, Iran’s state apparatus remained intact, with veteran politician Ali Larijani functioning as a central figure. Whether US and Israeli goals will be achieved — and what Iran’s future would look like — is uncertain.
Venezuela-style leadership swap
One possible outcome is a change of top personnel without dismantling Iran’s political system, a scenario likened to recent US actions in Venezuela. There, US special forces removed Nicolás Maduro and a political deal elevated his deputy, Delcy Rodríguez, as interim leader. Trump told The New York Times he had “three very good options” for Iran and suggested the Venezuelan approach was “the perfect scenario.”
Analysts say Tehran could install a successor to Khamenei who is more pragmatic and open to an accommodation with the West. Cornelius Adebahr of the German Council on Foreign Relations described this as swapping out the top leadership with fewer systemic shifts than many Iranians hope for.
Continuity with recalibration
Harvard Kennedy School scholar Peyman Asadzade offers a related possibility he calls “continuity with recalibration.” Under this trajectory, Iran’s Assembly of Experts selects a pragmatic successor who prioritizes economic reconstruction, stabilization, and governance reforms while shifting foreign policy toward de-escalation. Burcu Ozcelik of the Royal United Services Institute says a pragmatic successor could seek rapprochement with the United States to unlock economic relief and ease day-to-day pressures on millions of Iranians, potentially opening a path to recovery.
Hard-line, nuclear-entrenched regime
A more alarming scenario is a rallying of the regime around an even harder-line leader that doubles down on repression and pursues nuclear weapons as a survival guarantee. Guardian correspondent Julian Borger warned that repeated attacks could drive surviving leaders to conclude that a bomb is the only guarantee of survival, resulting in a more isolated, paranoid, and nuclear-armed Iran, with harsh domestic repression and deep international isolation.
Opposition actors and transition plans
Iran’s fragmented opposition has sought opportunities amid unrest. Reza Pahlavi, son of the late Shah, drew attention during January protests and has advocated a transition to democracy rather than a return to monarchy. US-based analysts Mark Dubowitz and Ben Cohen of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies acknowledge Pahlavi’s transition planning but stress that planning is not power. Iran is ethnically and politically diverse — a mosaic of Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluch and others — and many opposition figures remain imprisoned or exiled, complicating any clear succession.
Security forces, elite factions, and the risk of fragmentation
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) remains a dominant force. Established after the 1979 revolution to protect the new system, the IRGC today runs its own armed forces, intelligence networks, and extensive business interests. The EU has classified the IRGC as a terrorist organization after its role in suppressing recent protests. Early in the conflict, Trump called on Iran’s army, IRGC and police to lay down their weapons, but analysts see no sign these institutions have collapsed.
Ozcelik suggests the IRGC could face growing domestic resistance due to its elite patronage networks, potentially creating sharper institutional fault lines. One possible outcome is a divergence between the IRGC and the conventional army, with the regular military elevated as the “reformed” face of state rebuilding while IRGC factions vie for status and resources. Another possibility is fragmentation within the IRGC itself. Such splits, combined with competing loyalties across security services, could spark internal clashes or even civil war.
Ethnic minorities and separatism
Iran’s ethnic diversity also increases instability risks. Kurdish groups, for example, united publicly just before the war to oppose the regime and reject any interim rule by Pahlavi. In a power vacuum, separatist movements among Kurds, Azeris, Baluch and others could attempt to carve out autonomy or seize territory, further complicating any transition and raising the prospects of prolonged internal violence.
Uncertain outcomes and immense challenges
Experts outline multiple plausible futures: a managed leadership swap with limited systemic change; a pragmatic successor pursuing de-escalation and economic recovery; a harder-line, more repressive and potentially nuclear-armed regime; or chaotic fragmentation that risks civil war and regional spillover. Any post-war path faces daunting challenges — weakened institutions, elite competition, imprisoned dissidents, and a fragmented opposition — making a stable, democratic transition far from guaranteed.
For now, Iran’s fate remains unsettled. The balance between internal cohesion and fracture, between pragmatism and hard-line retrenchment, and between international pressure and domestic resilience will determine whether the country moves toward reconstruction, repression, or prolonged conflict.