The Rhineland-Palatinate state election marked a major advance for the Alternative for Germany (AfD). The party won 19.5% of the vote, more than doubling its share from the previous state contest and slightly outpacing its result in Baden-Württemberg two weeks earlier. Among working-class and low-income voters the AfD is now the leading option: about 39% of this group backed the party, and in parts of the former East Germany it attracts nearly half of blue-collar voters. Several regional AfD chapters have been flagged by domestic intelligence as far-right extremist.
Analysts tie much of the AfD’s growth to economic insecurity. Years of weak growth and the disappearance of many industrial jobs have widened fears of unemployment and downward mobility. Communications researcher Frank Brettschneider says the party taps into and amplifies these anxieties, portraying itself as better attuned to everyday concerns than established politicians. Broader strains — wars, climate disruption and the rapid effects of artificial intelligence — are testing democracies and intensifying voter uncertainty in Germany as elsewhere.
The AfD has taken votes from the Social Democratic Party (SPD), long regarded as the traditional workers’ party. A post-election analysis by Infratest dimap found 71% of respondents agreeing that the SPD no longer clearly stands with workers. The AfD positions itself to fill that perceived gap, accusing mainstream parties of being out of touch and presenting itself as the defender of ordinary people.
Working-class support for the AfD does not generally rest on confidence in its economic competence or social justice credentials. Instead, many voters prioritize migration and asylum policy along with crime and public-order issues — themes the AfD foregrounds. Campaign messaging often links migration to pressure on housing and public services and portrays immigrants as a threat to living standards, which resonates with voters who feel left behind.
Most economists argue the reverse: immigration is central to sustaining German prosperity. A 2025 study by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) concluded that increased migration offers substantial growth potential. DIW president Marcel Fratzscher warned in 2023 that the AfD’s economic platform would harm its own supporters: he described the party’s fiscal approach as highly neoliberal, favoring tax cuts for top earners, a reduced role for the state and deep cuts to social benefits — measures likely to undermine working-class interests.
The AfD has also sought links with organized labor. An association called Zentrum presents itself as an alternative labor movement and has tried for years to gain influence on works councils at major automotive plants. Zentrum competes with established unions such as IG Metall and has won seats on individual works councils at some Mercedes and Volkswagen sites. But its broader penetration in works council elections remains limited; IG Metall continues to dominate.
Voices on the left call for renewed engagement with working-class realities. Retired sociology professor Klaus Dörr argues that a significant share of workers could be won back if left-wing parties reconnect with their concerns. He points out that many workers no longer identify strongly with large employers, even long-standing firms, yet feel an attachment to the idea of homeland. Dörr urges left-wing forces to reclaim that notion from the AfD as a way to rebuild trust.
The AfD’s rise among workers reflects a mix of economic anxiety, cultural grievances and party strategies that emphasize migration and law-and-order themes. Economists caution that the party’s proposed fiscal policies would damage the material interests of many of its supporters, while its attempts to embed itself in workplace representation have so far produced limited results. The wider challenge for Germany’s left and center parties is to address both the economic and cultural concerns driving voters toward the AfD.
This article was originally written in German.