For more than two months commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been severely restricted, and African economies are already feeling the fallout. The blockade has disrupted flights, caused long queues at petrol stations, strained power supplies and left fields untended in parts of the continent. One of the most worrying knock-on effects is stress on fertilizer supplies: raw materials and chemical precursors that normally transit the Gulf are now harder and more expensive to obtain.
Restoring open maritime lanes will not be quick. Even if shipping resumed soon, markets, production lines and logistics chains would need weeks or months to stabilize. That uncertainty is forcing African governments and institutions into crisis mode as they weigh measures to avoid worst‑case outcomes such as food shortages or sovereign financial distress.
The African Union is closely monitoring the situation because key agricultural inputs are affected. Several countries are already heavily indebted, and rising import costs and inflation risk further weakening local currencies and public finances.
Fertilizer vulnerability is not new. In 2022 the disruption caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine pushed global fertilizer markets into turmoil—Russia and Belarus were major producers—yet famine was largely averted thanks to flexible policy responses, regional financing and multilateral support. That precedent shows there are tools available, but decisive action is needed fast.
Immediate measures and impacts
Fuel shortages from the blockade have already prompted emergency measures across Africa. Ethiopia has been prioritizing diesel for public transport while limiting private sales. South Sudan has implemented rolling blackouts to curb demand at its thermal plant. Gambia is using tax revenues to subsidize fuel, and Zimbabwe has turned to ethanol blending. Airlines across the continent are also suffering from kerosene shortfalls.
Fertilizer shortages have received less public attention but are equally serious. Before the crisis a large share of the sulphur used in phosphate fertilizers moved through the Strait of Hormuz, along with significant volumes of ammonia and urea. The South African grain body reported steep price rises: ammonia prices are roughly three quarters higher than a year earlier, and urea around 60% up.
Short-term fixes
Many countries already have emergency protocols for fuel rationing and prioritization. Comparable regional responses for fertilizers remain limited. A UN proposal to allow safe transit of fertilizer shipments through the strait—modeled on the Black Sea Grain Initiative that temporarily protected Ukrainian grain exports—has not been implemented.
A practical immediate option is pooled procurement. If African importers joined forces to buy fertilizers collectively, they could leverage greater bargaining power and secure faster, more affordable deliveries—similar in concept to how large blocs coordinated vaccine purchases during the COVID-19 pandemic. This could be organized continentally via the AU or by regional bodies such as ECOWAS or the East African Community if AU‑wide action stalls.
Many African farms already use far less fertilizer than the global average: as of pre‑war data, sub‑Saharan usage averaged about 20.5 kg per hectare versus nearly 144 kg worldwide. Further cuts in fertilizer application risk lower yields for staples like maize, rice and wheat, which would push up food prices at a time when the planting season is starting across much of the continent.
Medium to long-term responses
Reducing reliance on imports by expanding domestic and regional fertilizer production is the most resilient long‑term strategy. Morocco and Egypt are current African fertilizer producers with large phosphate reserves, but they still import sulphur and other inputs. Private investment is also expanding: the Dangote Group plans to open new urea plants in Nigeria and Ethiopia.
A realistic approach is to concentrate industrial fertilizer production in a few well‑placed countries that can serve regional markets, rather than expecting every country to build full production capacity. That model relies on efficient regional supply chains and reduced cross‑border trade frictions.
Here the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can play a key role: fewer customs delays and lower trade barriers would make regional distribution of fertilizers more viable and more attractive to investors. The AfCFTA has been operational since 2021, but implementation gaps remain. Accelerating its rollout would improve resilience in agriculture, energy and manufacturing value chains.
What governments and institutions can do now
– Coordinate emergency purchasing and stockpiling among countries or regions to stabilize supplies and prices.
– Prioritize fertilizer distribution to critical crops and smallholder farmers to protect food security.
– Use targeted subsidies or financing lines (multilateral development banks, regional funds) to prevent bankruptcies and avoid severe cuts in fertilizer use.
– Speed up policies and investments that enable regional production hubs where geology, infrastructure and industry conditions are favorable.
– Remove unnecessary trade barriers under AfCFTA rules to enable rapid regional redistribution of inputs.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has exposed the fragility of global supply chains for inputs that African agriculture depends on. Short‑term actions—pooled procurement, emergency finance and targeted rationing—can blunt the immediate shock. But the crisis also reinforces the case for deeper regional integration and selective industrial investment to produce and move fertilizers more reliably across Africa. The choices made now will shape food security and agricultural resilience in the years ahead.