On May 8 the United Arab Emirates intercepted another round of missiles and drones that officials say were launched by Iran, a strike the UAE Ministry of Defense warned residents not to approach or touch if debris fell. Abu Dhabi’s UN ambassador in Washington accused Tehran of targeting the Fujairah oil zone with a mix of ballistic and cruise missiles and drones; Iran has denied the claim. Whether disputed or not, the episode feeds a wider perception in the UAE that it has increasingly been a target in the growing regional confrontation—analysts note thousands of drone and missile strikes across the region since tensions escalated in late February.
The UAE’s vulnerability is assessed in part through the prism of its ties to the United States and Israel. Diplomatic relations with Israel, formalized under the US-brokered Abraham Accords in 2020, are widely seen as one reason Iran treats the UAE as a legitimate target. Michael Stephens of RUSI told DW that, from Tehran’s perspective, striking the UAE is a way to retaliate against Israel by hitting its partners. In response to the attacks, Abu Dhabi has deepened military, security and intelligence cooperation with Israel; media reporting indicates Israel has deployed air-defence systems and personnel to the UAE for the first time.
Long-running regional disputes also complicate relations. Territorial tensions—most notably over the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs—add a bilateral grievance to the wider strategic rivalry. When Iran briefly disrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and affected exports from other Gulf states, the UAE called for the strait’s reopening and urged stronger international measures. Emirati officials have also publicly denounced Tehran more forcefully than some other Gulf governments, a stance that has pushed Abu Dhabi closer to Washington and Jerusalem.
Several analysts argue Tehran’s attacks were intended to coerce the UAE into pressing the US to halt operations it views as targeting Iran. Instead, the strikes appear to have produced the opposite effect, accelerating security cooperation with Israel and the United States. UAE decision-makers also frame the attacks as an assault on their country’s central development model: the promise that the Gulf can remain secure and highly prosperous even amid regional instability. That perceived existential threat has hardened Abu Dhabi’s posture.
At the same time, the UAE is charting an increasingly independent foreign and economic course. Under long-term plans such as UAE 2031, the country is diversifying away from oil to become a hub for technology, tourism, investment and logistics. On May 1 the UAE formally left OPEC and the OPEC+ framework, signaling a recalibration of how it manages energy policy relative to its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.
This independent streak extends to regional strategy. The UAE and Saudi Arabia now pursue different policies on major regional questions; for example, the UAE and Bahrain normalized ties with Israel while Saudi Arabia suspended normalization talks after the October 2023 Hamas attacks and the subsequent Gaza war. Abu Dhabi has also become an assertive external actor across Africa and parts of the Middle East, pursuing economic and security interests through a range of political and military instruments.
Scholars such as Wolfram Lacher describe the UAE as one of the most active external players in African conflicts. Abu Dhabi has been engaged in Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. Analysts argue the rationale is strategic: securing access to resources, trade corridors and influence over maritime routes that matter for the UAE’s commercial ambitions. Military support and interventions, then, are framed as ways to protect long-term economic and logistical interests.
A notable characteristic of Emirati engagement is its preference for influence over direct, large-scale troop deployments. Instead, Abu Dhabi projects power through local partners and proxies—both state and non-state actors—such as Khalifa Haftar in Libya and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) in Sudan. Reports and expert assessments also link the UAE to financial support, equipment transfers and the recruitment of foreign fighters or mercenaries, including Sudanese contingents in Libya and, more recently, Colombian mercenaries in Sudan. Emirati officials routinely deny these specific allegations, but analysts say the weight of available evidence points to a pattern of covert or indirect involvement.
Taken together, these developments describe a UAE pursuing a dual strategy: closer security alignment with the United States and Israel to counter immediate threats, while asserting an independent, sometimes interventionist regional policy designed to secure economic corridors and future prosperity. That path carries risks—escalatory responses from rivals, reputational costs, and deepening entanglement in regional conflicts—but it also reflects Abu Dhabi’s calculation that protecting its security and commercial model requires both new alliances and a hands-on approach to geopolitics in the Middle East and Africa.
(Edited by Rob Mudge)