Global attention has shifted toward the US–Israel conflict with Iran, leaving other crises, including Russia’s war in Ukraine, lower on the news agenda. That shift matters: Kyiv is preparing for the possibility of a years-long, attritional conflict if US military shipments slow, while Moscow benefits from higher oil and gas revenues. Those economic dynamics sit alongside a military stalemate on the front lines.
The battlefield has largely reached a deadlock. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has made decisive territorial gains recently, even as Kyiv steps up strikes on oil export infrastructure deep inside Russia. At home, Russian President Vladimir Putin is reported to be seeing falling approval ratings amid periodic mobile internet outages and a worsening domestic economy.
International analysts speaking at the Kyiv Security Forum say the US midterm elections could be a pivotal moment for the course of the war. Political shifts in Washington — and how the US allocates weapons and attention — are likely to influence whether the conflict continues at its current pace, accelerates, or moves toward negotiation.
Would Russia mobilize again?
Observers have long speculated whether Moscow might order a fresh mass mobilization like the one in late 2022. Some Ukrainian military experts do not rule this out, but others, including Evelyn Farkas, a former Pentagon appointee now at the McCain Institute, argue another large-scale call-up is unlikely. She points to Russia’s economic strains as a major constraint on expanding the armed forces by mobilizing more citizens.
Can Ukraine become less dependent on Western arms?
Kurt Volker, a former US special representative for Ukraine, says Kyiv is in a stronger position than before and has cut its dependence on Western weapons. He estimates Ukraine could now meet roughly 60–70% of its needs domestically or through European suppliers, meaning it could continue fighting even if direct US shipments slowed. Volker also warned that the US may be unable to guarantee the same volume of missiles used with Patriot air defenses going forward, a limit he attributes in part to shifting US priorities.
Will US attention shift away from Ukraine?
Some analysts worry that a US focus on the Iran confrontation could lead to reallocation of military aid or political bandwidth away from Ukraine. Zelenskyy has publicly braced for increased pressure from Washington to accept a ceasefire that could involve Ukrainian withdrawals from contested parts of the Donbas. Farkas, however, expects Zelenskyy to resist demands that would cede Ukrainian-held territory.
Farkas also said that if the US resolves its Iran confrontation this summer, Washington might then prioritize other geopolitical objectives — she suggested Cuba as a possible focus — but she does not expect that to translate into increased pressure on Kyiv. Indeed, a US pivot elsewhere could weaken Russia strategically, she argued, because of Moscow’s ties with other regional actors.
A turning point after the midterms?
Both Farkas and Volker see the US midterm House elections in November as a potential inflection point. If Republican standing within the party weakens, it could increase pressure on the US government to maintain support for Ukraine and sustain NATO commitments. Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, chair of NATO’s military committee, has warned that the war would be difficult to decide on the battlefield because Russia’s military remains resilient despite losses.
That said, worsening economic conditions in Russia could alter Moscow’s calculus. Volker believes Russia may not accept a comprehensive peace agreement but could at some point agree to a ceasefire. He describes earlier negotiation attempts as farcical but thinks growing domestic pressures and battlefield realities could force Putin to consider pauses in fighting. Volker puts the odds of a significant shift before the end of the year at roughly 50 percent. Farkas is more forward-looking, predicting that Ukraine will be prevailing by 2027.
What to expect next
– Continued stalemate with periodic, targeted strikes that aim to degrade logistics and economic assets rather than produce vast territorial changes.
– Political developments in Washington — especially the November midterms — that could influence aid flows, weapons priorities, and diplomatic pressure.
– A low but rising chance that Russia opts for a ceasefire if domestic economic decline and battlefield attrition become unsustainable; a negotiated peace settlement, however, remains unlikely in the near term.
– Ongoing Ukrainian efforts to increase self-reliance in arms and ammunition, reducing vulnerability to changes in US policy but not eliminating the need for Western support.
Timing remains uncertain. Analysts disagree on how quickly conditions will change, but many see growing momentum toward a shift in the war’s character — whether that means a prolonged stalemate, a negotiated pause, or a path toward Ukrainian advantage over the coming years.
This article was translated from German.