As the US-Israel conflict with Iran moves past its third week, Iranian strikes on Israel and Gulf states have continued despite official claims that Tehran’s missile capability has been largely destroyed. A White House statement in mid-March said Iran’s ballistic missile capacity was “functionally destroyed,” yet attacks persisted in the days that followed, underlining a gap between public assessments and battlefield reality.
Analysts say Iran’s ability to launch massed strikes has been weakened but not eliminated. Burcu Ozcelik of RUSI describes a clear degradation in capability, while Kelly Grieco of the Stimson Center points to an operational shift: after an initial barrage of more than 500 ballistic missiles and about 2,000 drones that produced a low hit rate, Iran dramatically reduced launch volume and focused on higher-impact strikes. Launches fell by more than 90% while effectiveness increased — firing fewer weapons but achieving better results.
What systems does Iran possess?
Estimates of missile stocks vary because Tehran does not publish inventories. Israeli officials reportedly estimated roughly 2,500 missiles before the war; some independent analysts have suggested the number could be as high as 6,000. US intelligence long assessed Iran as possessing the region’s largest and most varied missile force.
Think-tank lists include medium- and intermediate-range systems such as Sejjil, Ghadr and Khorramshahr (ranges around 2,000 km), Emad (about 1,700 km), Shahab-3 (around 1,300 km) and Hoveyzeh (roughly 1,350 km). Attempts to strike locations much farther afield, including the Diego Garcia base nearly 4,000 km from Iran, have raised questions about longer-range capabilities beyond previous estimates. Ballistic missiles are also the most likely delivery option for any future nuclear device, a concern Iran denies is relevant.
How much has fighting reduced Iran’s stocks?
Sustained launches plus strikes on production and storage have clearly eroded Iranian inventories, but the full scale of losses is known only to Tehran. Israeli officials have said drone and missile capabilities were heavily degraded, yet Iran has continued to use missile and drone strikes and at times exerted significant leverage over regional waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz. Reported underground ‘‘missile cities’’ in provinces including Kermanshah and Semnan and sites near the Gulf complicate any effort to remove stocks and destroy production capacity.
Drone capacity and economics
Unmanned aerial vehicles are a pillar of Iran’s strike posture. Early estimates circulated of very large Shahed drone stocks — numbers such as 80,000 have been cited but carry substantial uncertainty. Drones are far cheaper and faster to build than ballistic missiles, letting Iran sustain pressure and target infrastructure while imposing high costs on defenders. US spending to defeat and track these attacks has been described in the hundreds of millions to roughly a billion dollars per day, illustrating an outsized economic burden for anti-drone operations.
Can Iran rebuild during the war?
Drones are easier to replenish and some pre-war production estimates suggested capacity of thousands to tens of thousands of Shahed-class drones per month in peacetime, although wartime disruption likely reduces output. Missiles are more complex, but Iran has an industrial base for missile production and limited reliance on foreign imports — SIPRI data for 2021–25 show Iran accounted for a tiny share of global arms imports, implying substantial domestic manufacturing.
Iranian officials have publicly said production continues even under attack. An IRGC spokesman claimed missiles were being produced in wartime and stockpiled without difficulty; that spokesman was later reported killed in an airstrike.
Outside estimates of missile production under current pressures differ. One former Pentagon official suggested Iran might have been able to build roughly 300 missiles per month before strikes intensified, with that rate falling to perhaps 40 per month under wartime conditions — roughly equivalent to a single large volley. For US and Israeli planners the critical question is not only current stocks but whether strikes on factories, stores and hardened or underground sites can deny Iran the ability to reconstitute its missile forces long term.
Strategic implications
Iran’s mix of ballistic missiles and large drone inventories gives it asymmetric options to strike across the region and project influence. Losses and damage have reduced Tehran’s immediate punch, but remaining stockpiles, dispersed and sheltered facilities, and domestic production mean the threat persists. Long-term neutralization would require sustained actions aimed at both destroying existing weapons and preventing replenishment by targeting production, storage and hardened infrastructure.