India is remaking Great Nicobar, its southernmost territory at the tip of the Andaman and Nicobar chain, into a major strategic and economic hub. Closer to Indonesia’s Sumatra than to the Indian mainland and sitting near the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, the island occupies a pivotal position along one of the world’s busiest shipping routes. New Delhi plans roughly $9 billion of investment to build a transshipment port, airport, township and energy and support infrastructure at Galathea Bay — a project that has prompted controversy over the environmental cost and impacts on Indigenous groups such as the Shompen, including the felling of about 852,000 trees.
The scale of the program signals a shift in India’s posture from a continental emphasis to a more outward-looking maritime stance. Proximity to the Malacca approaches promises improved oversight of a key artery of global trade, including energy flows that sustain major economies. Yet what the island delivers in military terms is debated.
Some analysts emphasize denial rather than power projection. Former Air Marshal R. Nambiar says the chief value of Great Nicobar is preventing rivals from controlling the approaches rather than mounting far-reaching naval campaigns: a land base is “unsinkable,” he argues, and geography can be used to secure choke points. Former Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria stresses the operational benefits, noting the island would position India roughly 150 kilometers from the Strait of Malacca and markedly improve domain awareness in both air and maritime spheres.
Other specialists underline that economic motives are at least as important as strategic ones. Srikanth Kondapalli of Jawaharlal Nehru University describes the project as “economic first, strategic second,” designed to reduce dependence on foreign transshipment hubs while boosting trade. At the same time, he warns that China’s expanding Indian Ocean footprint — port access in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Djibouti, regular submarine and surveillance ship deployments, maritime mapping and island development across thousands of features — cannot be ignored and helps explain India’s urgency.
Assessments of operational impact vary. Atul Kumar of the Observer Research Foundation argues that forward infrastructure will strengthen surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance, extend air reach, shorten patrol distances and improve the sustainability of deployed assets, thereby enhancing deterrence. He cautions, however, that converting geographic advantage into sustained interdiction or “chokehold” would require much larger fleets, more submarines, and close coordination with partners.
Former ambassador Ashok Kantha likewise notes the island’s geographic value for monitoring sea-lane activity, humanitarian response and reducing reliance on foreign hubs, but stresses that logistics, force posture and broader political and economic choices will determine whether those advantages translate into enduring operational power.
The Great Nicobar program thus embodies a duality: a development project with clear strategic implications. New Delhi’s bet is that infrastructure on this remote island will both spur trade and strengthen India’s foothold in a region where Beijing has steadily expanded its reach. Whether the gamble yields sustained control or primarily enhances surveillance and deterrence — while exacting environmental and social costs — will depend on long-term investments in military capability, partnerships, and policies to mitigate local impacts.