Romania has long seen short‑lived administrations; since the 2012 constitutional crisis the country has had many prime ministers and cabinets. The most recent government led by Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan and the National Liberal Party (PNL) was brought down in a parliamentary no‑confidence vote after just ten months in office. The motion passed with 281 votes in favour across the two houses’ 464 seats.
What made this collapse exceptional was the alliance of convenience behind the motion: the Social Democratic Party (PSD), traditionally part of Romania’s pro‑European camp, cooperated with the far‑right, pro‑Russian Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) to table and carry the vote. While ad hoc cross‑bloc votes have occurred before, this was the first coordinated, planned effort of that kind and is widely seen as the effective breakdown of the informal “firewall” pro‑democracy parties had maintained against the far right. The PSD has sought to downplay that interpretation.
The no‑confidence motion capped months of internal strain within Bolojan’s four‑party, pro‑European coalition, formed in June 2025 and composed of PNL, PSD, the Save Romania Union (USR) and the Hungarian minority party UDMR. Tensions peaked when PSD ministers withdrew from the government roughly two weeks before the vote and began rallying parliamentary support for the motion.
Political background helps explain the stakes. Romania entered this parliamentary term after a turbulent presidential period: an annulled November 2024 contest over alleged foreign interference and a rerun in May 2025. In that rerun AUR leader George Simion narrowly lost, taking just over 46% of the vote. In the late‑2024 parliamentary elections, three far‑right parties together won about 30% of the vote. After his May 2025 victory, president Nicuşor Dan urged the formation of a pro‑European coalition and an explicit firewall against the far right — pressure that helped produce the coalition backing Bolojan.
The Bolojan government took office amid a severe economic crisis: a budget deficit exceeding 9%, slowing growth, an oversized state administration and stalled reforms. Early policies included tax increases such as a higher sales tax that angered parts of the public, though polls indicated many Romanians still supported the reform agenda.
Bolojan pressed a broad reform program targeting the bloated state apparatus, state‑owned enterprises and the pension system. Tens of thousands of public positions were cut, bureaucratic structures streamlined and redundant roles in state firms reduced. These measures helped narrow some deficit indicators but provoked political and social pushback. The most contentious step was phasing out a special pension scheme for some members of the judiciary: under the old rules, certain civil servants could retire before 50 with pensions averaging around €5,000 monthly and in rare cases up to €15,000, compared with a national average pension of about €500–€600. Raising retirement ages and curbing those benefits intensified coalition friction and may now face reversal or delay.
PSD’s internal dynamics played a key role. Though a member of the mainstream European social‑democratic family, PSD has roots in the former Communist Party and has shifted in recent years to include some nationalist and right‑leaning positions; a small far‑right faction exists within it. Opposition to Bolojan’s reforms grew inside the PSD, and Bolojan accused the party of behaving like an opposition force while still in government, calling the no‑confidence motion “dishonest, cynical and artificial.” PSD’s cooperation with AUR drew criticism in Brussels, including within the Socialists and Democrats group in the European Parliament.
What happens next is governed by the constitution: the president can repeatedly nominate a prime ministerial candidate to try to form a new cabinet, each of which must win a parliamentary confidence vote; if repeated attempts fail, the president may dissolve parliament. Politically, options are contested. Some PNL figures favour negotiating a new government with PSD; USR and UDMR oppose that route. AUR says it will not enter coalition with PSD — which it calls part of the establishment — and is pushing for snap elections to build on its 2024 performance. President Nicuşor Dan, however, quickly ruled out early elections, described the vote as a “democratic decision,” urged calm and expressed confidence that consultations and constitutional steps can produce a new pro‑Western, pro‑European government.
The collapse raises the risk that snap elections would boost the far right, but the immediate outcome will depend on post‑vote negotiations, PSD’s next moves, and whether a parliamentary majority can be reconstructed without returning to the ballot box.
This article was originally published in German.