India is transforming Great Nicobar Island, its southernmost territory in the Bay of Bengal, into a major strategic asset. Located at the tip of the Andaman and Nicobar chain, closer to Indonesia’s Sumatra than to the Indian mainland, the island sits near the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors. New Delhi is investing about $9 billion to build a transshipment port, airport, township and supporting infrastructure. The project has drawn criticism over environmental and social impacts, including the felling of roughly 852,000 trees and risks to Indigenous communities such as the Shompen.
The scale of the project reflects a shift in India’s strategic thinking from a mainland focus to a more outward-looking maritime posture. Proximity to the Malacca Strait offers the ability to monitor a main artery of global trade, including a significant share of China’s energy flows. But what that proximity delivers in military terms is contested.
Former Air Marshal R. Nambiar argues the chief value of Great Nicobar is denying rivals control of the region rather than projecting power. “We do not need to project power. We need to deny the adversary passage through our backyard,” he told DW, pointing to the challenges of facing a “blue-water navy” capable of operating globally and exposed to precision strikes and aerospace power. “Land base is unsinkable. We should focus on choke points and use geography to our advantage,” he added.
In India’s strategic thinking, these calculations are usually framed around China, its populous and powerful neighbor. Over two decades Beijing has built influence across the Indian Ocean—securing port access in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Djibouti, deploying submarines and surveillance ships with increasing regularity, and mapping seabeds in regions Indian planners regard as their strategic backyard. Great Nicobar is, in part, India’s answer to that accumulation of pressure.
Former Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria said the new infrastructure will be pivotal to securing trade routes and strengthening India’s maritime posture. “Strategically, it is crucial to understand that this will provide us with the capability to position ourselves just 150 kilometers away from the Strait of Malacca. Our overall domain awareness, both in the air and maritime spheres, will receive a significant boost,” he told the Press Trust of India.
But countering China’s military footprint is only part of India’s equation for developing Great Nicobar. Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor of Chinese studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, told DW the driver is “economic first, strategic second.” He noted that China has developed around 3,000 islands since the 1990s and that much of its economic activity flows through them. India’s plans at Galathea Bay—to build a transshipment terminal, airport, township and energy infrastructure—aim to boost trade and reduce dependence on foreign hubs. Yet the infrastructure also has potential military uses, depending on threat perceptions.
Kondapalli warns China’s presence in the Indian Ocean cannot be ignored: “China is sending submarines every year and over nine surveillance ships annually. We have seen Chinese vessels docking in Male after passing near the Andaman and Nicobar chain, and earlier at Hambantota, despite Indian concerns.” He added that China monitors Indian space launches from Great Coco Island, is mapping the Bay of Bengal, and is expanding fishing activity while restricting access in the South China Sea.
Assessments of Great Nicobar’s likely impact vary. Atul Kumar, a fellow for national security and China studies at the Observer Research Foundation, says the buildup strengthens India’s operational posture by enhancing surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance, enabling faster response and more credible deterrence signaling. Forward infrastructure will extend air reach, reduce patrol distances and improve the ability of aircraft and naval assets to remain deployed longer. But he cautions against overstating its effect: “It does not provide a chokehold. Sustained interdiction would require far greater capabilities and coordination.” India would need a larger fleet, more submarines and stronger partnerships to translate geography into real control.
Ashok Kantha, former Indian ambassador to China, acknowledges the island’s geographic value but urges caution before drawing definitive conclusions on operational power. He says development aims to reduce reliance on foreign transshipment hubs, speed humanitarian and disaster response, and strengthen India’s maritime presence in the eastern Indian Ocean. “Its proximity to the Malacca approaches makes it valuable for monitoring sea lane activity, but converting that geographic advantage into sustained operational power will depend on logistics, force posture, and broader political and economic choices,” Kantha told DW.
The Great Nicobar project thus embodies a duality: economic development with clear strategic implications. New Delhi’s bet is that infrastructure on this remote island will both boost trade and give India a stronger foothold in a region where Beijing has steadily expanded its reach. Whether the gamble yields sustained operational control, or mainly enhances surveillance and deterrence while posing environmental and social costs, will hinge on broader investments in military capability, alliances, and long-term policy choices.
Edited by: Darko Janjevic