As the US-Israel war with Iran nears its fourth week, Iranian missiles continue to strike Israel and Gulf states despite US and Israeli claims of severely degrading Tehran’s missile stocks. A White House post on March 14 said “Iran’s ballistic missile capacity is functionally destroyed,” yet strikes have continued, including multiple attacks reported 10 days later.
Experts say Iran’s launching capability has been degraded but not exhausted. Burcu Ozcelik, a Middle East security analyst at RUSI, said degradation has occurred, but Iran still retains meaningful capacity. Kelly Grieco of the Stimson Center noted an “operational pivot”: after an opening salvo of more than 500 ballistic missiles and 2,000 drones with a below-5% hit rate, launch rates fell by more than 90% while hit rates rose — Iran began firing less but hitting more often.
What missiles does Iran have?
Estimates vary because Iran does not disclose stocks. Israel reportedly estimated about 2,500 missiles pre-war; some independent experts put the figure as high as 6,000. Even before the current fighting, US intelligence said Iran had the region’s largest and most diverse missile arsenal.
Think tanks list a range of ballistic systems: Sejjil, Ghadr and Khorramshahr (around 2,000 km range), Emad (1,700 km), Shahab-3 (1,300 km) and Hoveyzeh (1,350 km). Recent attempts to strike the UK/US base on Diego Garcia — nearly 4,000 km from Iran — suggest Iran may field longer-range missiles than previously assessed. Ballistic missiles also serve as potential delivery systems for nuclear weapons, though Iran denies pursuing nuclear arms.
How much impact has the war had on Iran’s stocks?
Firing hundreds of missiles and strikes on production and storage sites have reduced stocks, but the exact extent is unknown outside Iran’s inner circle. Israeli leaders have said drone and missile capabilities were “massively degraded,” yet Iran continues to launch attacks and has used leverage such as effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz at times. There are reports of at least five underground “missile cities” in provinces such as Kermanshah and Semnan and near the Gulf, complicating efforts to eliminate stocks and production.
What is Iran’s drone capacity?
Drones are central to Iran’s military strength. Estimates cited early in the fighting put Shahed drone stocks around 80,000, though accuracy is uncertain and usage numbers in the current war are unclear. Drones are cheaper and quicker to produce than missiles, allowing Iran to sustain influence and strike infrastructure at lower cost. The US has spent at roughly $1 billion per day on the campaign, and destroying swarms of inexpensive drones often requires costlier systems.
Can Iran replenish missiles and drones?
Drones are easier to replace. Some estimates suggest a peacetime capacity of around 10,000 Shaheds per month, though wartime disruption likely reduces that. Missiles are more complex, but Iran has industrial structures for rearmament. SIPRI data (2021–25) indicate Iran accounted for only 0.05% of global arms imports, suggesting a degree of domestic production.
Statements from Iranian officials have emphasized continued production. Gen. Ali Mohammad Naeini, an IRGC spokesperson, said Iran was producing missiles “even during war conditions” and had no particular problem stockpiling; he was reportedly killed soon after in an airstrike.
Outside assessments vary on production rates under attack. A former Pentagon official estimated Iran could build about 300 missiles per month at the start of the war, but that pace may have fallen to roughly 40 a month — about a single day’s volley — under current conditions. The key question for the US and Israel is whether they can degrade Iran’s ability to recover and reconstitute its missile program over the longer term by targeting production, storage, and underground facilities.
Strategic implications
Iran’s mix of ballistic missiles and large drone inventories gives it asymmetric options to strike regionally and project power. While recent strikes and losses have reduced capacity, the combination of remaining stocks, possible hidden or hardened sites, and production capabilities means Iran retains a continuing threat. Neutralizing that threat in the long term — limiting Iran’s ability to rebuild missile forces after the war — appears to be a central objective for US and Israeli operations. Edited by: Rob Mudge