Since their leaders declared a “no-limits” partnership before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, trade ties between Russia and China have deepened — but increasingly in China’s favor. What began as a political alignment has become an economic relationship in which Beijing supplies critical goods, finance and technology that Moscow now relies on to sustain its war economy.
Trade figures illustrate the shift. In 2024 Russia exported about $129 billion worth of goods to China, overwhelmingly crude oil, coal and natural gas sold at heavy discounts. Research by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air estimates China has purchased more than €319 billion ($372 billion) in Russian fossil fuels since the war began, giving Moscow the hard currency needed to fund military operations despite Western sanctions.
At the same time China exported nearly $116 billion of machinery, electronics, vehicles and other manufactured goods to Russia in 2024. Those shipments have largely replaced Western suppliers that left the Russian market and include many items with dual uses — civilian products and technologies that can also support weapons production — even if Beijing has stopped short of directly providing finished military hardware.
Western sanctions since 2022 have been a major driver of Russia’s pivot to China. The United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom and other allies have banned exports of semiconductors, microelectronics, precision machine tools and other dual-use technologies central to modern weapons manufacturing. Cut off from many advanced Western inputs, Russian industry has faced acute shortages.
Moscow turned to alternative suppliers, and China has filled a large share of that gap. Bloomberg reported that by 2025 Chinese sources accounted for roughly 90% of Russia’s imports of sanctioned technologies, up from 80% a year earlier. Obtaining specialized machine tools, microelectronics and other components now typically involves complex routing through third countries and paying substantial premia — in some cases nearly doubling pre-war prices.
Beyond components, Chinese firms and state sources have supplied satellite imagery, earth observation data and drones that can be used for military purposes. Those technologies have helped Russia maintain and even expand production of missiles, drones and other weapon systems, sustaining the logistics of a prolonged conflict.
Financially, the relationship has shifted away from the dollar. After major Russian banks were removed from the SWIFT payment system and roughly $300 billion of Russia’s foreign reserves were frozen, Moscow and Beijing accelerated efforts to settle trade in their national currencies. Russian officials say the two countries now clear over 99% of bilateral trade in yuan and rubles.
This “yuanization” reduces Russia’s exposure to Western financial measures but creates new dependencies. Russia sometimes faces shortages of yuan, encounters higher borrowing costs, and is increasingly exposed to Beijing’s priorities in negotiations. While China does not seek to supplant the dollar globally overnight, wider use of the yuan strengthens Beijing’s economic influence: countries holding or borrowing in renminbi become more tied to China’s economy and policy choices.
Institutional nudges reinforce the trend. BRICS and other emerging-market forums promote local-currency settlements and have even discussed longer-term steps such as a common settlement currency, further normalizing departures from dollar-based trade among participating states.
Looking ahead, analysts expect China’s leverage over Russia to grow. Russian President Vladimir Putin has pressed for expanded pipeline capacity and other long-term energy deals during summits with Chinese leaders. Projects like the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline — designed to carry up to 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year to China via Mongolia — remain stalled over price and technical disputes but are central to Moscow’s push to lock in export revenue.
For Beijing, increased overland energy links are a strategic hedge. Greater ability to import oil and gas by pipeline reduces China’s vulnerability to disruptions in maritime routes that could occur in a crisis involving Taiwan or other tensions, thereby boosting its energy security. Any major expansion of pipeline exports would further tie Russia’s economic future to China and deepen Beijing’s bargaining power.
A potential thaw in US-China relations complicates Putin’s calculus. Closer ties between Washington and Beijing would reduce China’s incentive to align fully with Russia against the West, since Beijing is keen to protect its sizable trade and financial ties with the United States and Europe.
The net effect is a partnership that provides Moscow with crucial economic lifelines — energy revenues, access to technology and alternative payment systems — while leaving Russia increasingly vulnerable to Beijing’s strategic and economic priorities. What once was presented as a relationship of equals now looks more like a dependency: Russia needs China’s markets, technology and currency, and China can leverage that reliance to shape outcomes important to its national interests.