Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military has lost and then partly regained ground. The takeover undermined the economy, increased international isolation and led to accusations of serious abuses. Armed resistance expanded quickly after the coup, seizing large tracts of territory and pushing the junta to the brink in many areas. Over the past 18 months, however, the regime has slowed further losses, launched new offensives and taken political steps to reduce its isolation.
Aung San Suu Kyi, detained since the coup, was moved from prison to house arrest, a development U.N. officials called a step toward conditions for a political process. Critics see the transfer as cosmetic, designed to polish the military’s image rather than mark genuine reform.
The regime organized elections widely viewed as rigged. The National League for Democracy and other parties were banned, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party declared victory, and coup leader Min Aung Hlaing was picked as president after resigning as commander-in-chief. Western governments largely dismissed the vote as a sham, but some regional actors have begun reengaging. Foreign ministers from Thailand and China have made official visits, and ASEAN faces pressure to restore Myanmar’s full membership status.
On the battlefield the picture is mixed. Resistance groups still control or contest much of the territory they gained after the coup, yet the military has reclaimed some strategically important areas, including trade routes to China and Thailand that had been severed. Diplomatic pressure from China on larger armed groups has led to reduced fighting in certain sectors, the handover of some locations and a decline in arms flows between groups, helping the junta stabilize parts of the country.
A key factor has been the weakening of the People’s Defense Forces, grassroots units that emerged nationwide and bore much of the fighting. Field research suggests rising defections and shrinking unit sizes, leaving many PDFs less able to conduct coordinated operations. Even previously ascendant ethnic armed organizations, such as the Arakan Army and the Kachin Independence Army, face strains.
Analysts describe the resistance as in structural decline in some areas while the regime consolidates in the military’s Bamar-majority heartland. Experts say the military is not delivering a decisive, countrywide victory but is no longer in continuous retreat. Momentum has shifted toward the junta in several theaters, though that shift falls short of a final outcome.
The military suffered its heaviest setbacks during Operation 1027 in late 2023 and early 2024, when resistance forces captured regional command centers and numerous battalion bases. Since then, external support—most notably diplomatic pressure and engagement from China—has helped blunt further losses and enabled limited recoveries. Observers argue the opposition remains too fragmented to topple the regime, while the junta lacks the capacity to crush all resistance swiftly.
The human cost has been severe. Tens of thousands of fighters and civilians have died and more than three million people remain displaced. Although overall violence has eased from the peak around Operation 1027, fighting remains widespread and popular anger over the coup means armed opposition is likely to persist.
The military also faces vulnerabilities: elite rivalries, weak governance outside major cities and a faltering economy that constrain how far it can extend control. Still, through territorial gains, a contested election that offers a veneer of legitimacy, diplomatic outreach and the erosion of key resistance components, the junta has moved from near-survival toward a more stable, if fragile, position.
In short, the junta is not delivering a conclusive victory but has regained momentum and is incrementally prevailing in some areas. The conflict is likely to remain protracted: the military is more confident than it was a few years ago, but the conditions for an enduring peace or a clear military triumph have not yet emerged.